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REALITY CHECK:
A MODEST MODIFICATION TO RATIONALIZE
RULE 803 HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
Liesa L. Richter*
[T]he values of hearsay declarations or writings, and the need for them, in
particular situations cannot with any degree of realism be thus minutely
ticketed in advance . . . . Too much worthless evidence will fit the
categories, too much that is vitally needed will be left out.1

INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence (or “the Rules”) identify hearsay that is
admissible, notwithstanding the classic hearsay prohibition, by delineating
categories of hearsay statements that may be admitted into evidence.2 For
example, “dying declarations” of now-unavailable declarants may be
admitted in homicide prosecutions or civil cases.3 “Excited utterances”
relating to a startling event also may be admitted for their truth.4 The
purported justification for admitting certain categories of hearsay rests upon
the inherent reliability of human statements uttered in certain contexts, as
well as litigants’ need for crucial evidence to build cases.5
Criticism of this categorical approach to hearsay is longstanding.6 As
illustrated by Professor Charles McCormick’s critique above, detractors
* William J. Alley Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. I would like
to thank the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence for hosting this dialogue
about the future of hearsay and for including me in the conversation.
1. Charles T. McCormick, Tomorrow’s Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A. J. 507, 512 (1938)
(advocating a discretionary approach to hearsay evidence and criticizing “sharp categories”
of hearsay exceptions as “strange”).
2. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:66 (4th
ed. 2013) (noting that the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence chose “prescriptive and
limiting” categories of hearsay exceptions).
3. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
4. Id. 803(2).
5. Id. 803 advisory committee’s note (“[U]nder appropriate circumstances a hearsay
statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify
nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial.”).
6. See, e.g., Paul S. Milich, Hearsay Antinomies: The Case for Abolishing the Rule and
Starting Over, 71 OR. L. REV. 723, 774–78 (1992); David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last
Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1 (opining that lawyers sometimes develop a “fondness” for
the “oddities of hearsay law,” but that it is the sort of “affection a volunteer docent might
develop for the creaky, labyrinthine corridors of an ancient mansion, haphazardly expanded
over the centuries”).

1473

1474

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

prior to the enactment of the Rules complained that preordained hearsay
categories could never accurately capture reliable human communications.7
Of course, the Federal Rules of Evidence answered the concern that
categorical exceptions would miss or omit reliable hearsay that is vitally
needed for the resolution of a case by including the residual exception to the
hearsay prohibition.8 Pursuant to the residual exception, trial judges have
the discretion to admit hearsay that does not fit within the preordained
categories so long as it enjoys equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness.9
But concerns about “worthless evidence” fitting within the categories of
admissible hearsay have never been addressed within the Rules, and the
hearsay exceptions continue to draw fire on this account.10 Most recently,
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sharply
criticized the present sense impression and excited utterance hearsay
exceptions in his concurring opinion in United States v. Boyce,11 opining
that those categorical exceptions are capable of admitting wholly unreliable
hearsay statements.12
Critics have proposed various responses to the perceived failings of the
categorical model. For example, Professor Edmund Morgan proposed
admitting all hearsay statements made by testifying or unavailable
declarants to avoid altogether categorical hearsay exceptions and questions
about the reliability of hearsay statements.13 Judge Jack Weinstein
proposed a discretionary approach to hearsay, allowing the trial judge to
weigh the probative force of particular hearsay statements on a case-by-case
basis.14 In his recent concurrence in Boyce, Judge Posner echoed Judge
Weinstein’s approach and suggested that the categorical hearsay exceptions

7. See also Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 337
(1961) (“Wigmore’s rationale . . . makes admissible a class of hearsay rather than particular
hearsay for which, in the circumstances of the case, there is need and assurance of
reliability.” (emphasis added)).
8. FED. R. EVID. 807.
9. Id.
10. See Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 1, 38–47 (AM.
LAW INST. 1942) (describing how much probative evidence the hearsay rule excludes and
how much unreliable evidence of low probative value the categorical hearsay exceptions
permit); Richard D. Friedman, Truth and Its Rivals in the Law of Hearsay and
Confrontation, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 545, 552 (1998) (opining that “few lawyers are satisfied
with the cracker-barrel psychology that underlies exceptions like the one for excited
utterances”); Weinstein, supra note 7, at 339 (“[A] series of independent letters written by
disinterested ministers who were eyewitnesses to an event and who are shown to have acute
vision, sound memories, and clear powers of communication might well be given more
weight than many dying declarations or implied admissions which may be made by a party
having no knowledge of the event or may have been made many years before by a
predecessor in interest who had every motive to lie.”).
11. 742 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2014); id. at 801 (“[A]s with much of the folk psychology of
evidence, it is difficult to take this rationale . . . entirely seriously.” (quoting Lust v. Sealy,
Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 588 (7th Cir. 2004))).
12. Id. at 800–01 (opining that there are flaws in the justifications for present sense
impressions and excited utterances).
13. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE r. 503.
14. See Weinstein, supra note 7, at 337–38 (advocating for greater discretionary power
for trial judges to admit hearsay evidence and criticizing class-based hearsay exceptions).
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should be dismantled and that the residual or catchall hearsay exception
should drive every decision about the admissibility of hearsay evidence.15
This proposed change would require trial judges to consider the reliability
of hearsay on a statement-by-statement basis to determine admissibility,
thus permitting a more individualized assessment of hearsay evidence.
This modification would create broader discretion to admit hearsay
evidence, but it also would allow the trial judge new flexibility to exclude
or reject hearsay evidence that has long been admissible through categorical
exceptions. In this way, Judge Posner’s proposal addresses longstanding
concerns about “worthless” hearsay being admitted and resolves his own
dissatisfaction with being constrained to admit hearsay through the
allegedly suspect present sense impression and excited utterance
exceptions.16
In a recent article, I explored the significant costs and scant benefits of
the purely discretionary approach to hearsay evidence proposed by Judge
That article highlighted the uncertainty, unfairness, and
Posner.17
inconsistency inherent in such an approach. Accordingly, the article
concluded that dismantling the categorical hearsay exceptions in favor of a
single discretionary residual exception would diminish efficiency and
fairness in the litigation market at a time when exploding costs threaten the
utility of the jury trial as a mechanism for dispute resolution.18
Rejecting Judge Posner’s discretionary approach, however, does nothing
to answer his criticism that the current categorical hearsay exceptions allow
unreliable statements to be admitted into evidence. Of course, one possible
response to this criticism is: Who cares? There are credible arguments to
be made that the primary function of the categorical exceptions is to provide
a degree of certainty about admissible hearsay, that no system that provides
such certainty can realistically hope to achieve perfect reliability, and that
the categorical exceptions are serving their purpose notwithstanding the
possibility that they will allow some unreliable hearsay into evidence.19
That said, the ceaseless criticism of the categorical exceptions for
admitting the unreliable is difficult to ignore, particularly when it comes
from authorities like Judge Posner and a panel of the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals.20 Should the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
15. Boyce, 742 F.3d at 802 (Posner, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 801 (“It is time the law awakened from its dogmatic slumber.”).
17. Liesa L. Richter, Posnerian Hearsay: Slaying the Discretion Dragon, 67 FLA. L.
REV. 1861, 1861 (2015).
18. Id. at 1866, 1907–08.
19. Id. at 1894–907 (discussing strong arguments in favor of maintaining existing
categorical hearsay exceptions); see also Symposium on Hearsay Reform, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1323, 1364–68 (2016) (describing crucial certainty provided by the scheme of
categorical hearsay exceptions).
20. Many scholars have offered similar criticisms of the present sense impression and
excited utterance exceptions. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain
Future of Present Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 337–38 (2012) (advocating a
corroboration limitation on the present sense impression exception to control flow of
unreliable electronic hearsay); Douglas D. McFarland, Present Sense Impressions Cannot
Live in the Past, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 907 (2001) (proposing an amendment to eliminate
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Evidence (or “the Advisory Committee”) seek to address this longstanding
criticism, there are alternatives to the Posner proposal that could respond to
concerns about the categorical exceptions without generating the same costs
and inefficiencies. This Article theorizes about one potential amendment to
Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that could address old and new
criticisms that the hearsay exceptions in that Rule are capable of admitting
unreliable and “worthless” hearsay.
If courts and commentators continue to be concerned about the fallible
assumptions of reliability underlying the Rule 803 exceptions, the Advisory
Committee could propose to expand the “trustworthiness” exception—
which is an existing feature of the business and public records exceptions—
to additional Rule 803 exceptions, like the much-maligned present sense
impression and excited utterance exceptions. This modification would
allow the opponent of hearsay evidence falling within those exceptions the
opportunity to show that the hearsay statements nonetheless lack
trustworthiness due to the circumstances of their making or the sources of
their information.
With this amendment, Professor McCormick’s pre-Rules criticism of
categorical exceptions would finally be answered. The residual exception
would continue to permit the admission of reliable hearsay not captured by
the categorical exceptions, and this new modification would permit the
exclusion of demonstrably unreliable statements that happen to fit within
those preordained categories.
I. AN OLD FRIEND:
THE TRUSTWORTHINESS EXCEPTION
Rules 803(6), (7), and (8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence all include a
trustworthiness exception to the admissibility of the hearsay statements that
they describe.21 As an example, Rule 803(6), the business records
exception, provides that business records satisfying the basic requirements
of the exception are admissible so long as “the opponent does not show that
the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate a lack of trustworthiness.”22 The absence of business records and
public records exceptions contain similar provisos.23
The origins of these trustworthiness exceptions can be traced to the preRules U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Palmer v. Hoffman.24 The Palmer
suit was brought against the trustees of a railroad company due to a grade
crossing accident that killed the plaintiff’s spouse.25 By the time of trial,
“immediately after” language in the present sense impression exception); Alan G. Williams,
Abolishing the Excited Utterance Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay, 63 U. KAN. L. REV.
717, 757–59 (2015) (reacting to Judge Posner’s Boyce concurrence with a proposal to
abolish Rule 803(2) in favor of an excited utterance-like exception requiring both
unavailability and corroboration).
21. FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(E), (7)(C), (8)(B).
22. Id. 803(6)(E).
23. Id. 803(7)(C), (8)(B).
24. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
25. Id. at 110–11.
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the train engineer involved in the accident had died.26 Accordingly, the
railroad company sought to introduce the engineer’s recorded statement of
his version of the accident, arguing that the statement was routinely made in
the regular course of the railroad company’s business.27 Applying the
federal statute that was a precursor to Rule 803(6), the trial court excluded
the statement, and the jury returned a verdict against the railroad.28 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of the
engineer’s statement, finding it “dripping with motivations to
misrepresent.”29
In affirming exclusion of the engineer’s statement, the Supreme Court
found that the accident report was not made in the course of the railroad’s
regular business operations.30
According to the Court, admitting
“employees’ versions of their accidents” as records made in the regular
course of business would constitute a “real perversion of a rule designed to
facilitate admission of records which experience has shown to be quite
trustworthy.”31 The Court in Palmer, therefore, found that the engineer’s
statement was not made in the regular course of railroading and that the
threshold requirements of the business records statute were not satisfied.32
In crafting Rule 803(6), the Advisory Committee noted that the exclusion
of the record in Palmer was driven primarily by concerns about the railroad
engineer’s incentives to falsify his account of the accident.33
Acknowledging the impossibility of identifying specific business records
that will be free of such concerns in all cases, the Advisory Committee
elected to craft an exception that would admit all records routinely made in
the course of a regularly conducted activity, “subject to authority to exclude
if ‘the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.’”34
Thus, the trustworthiness exception to the business records exception
recognizes the reality behind the Rule. While the vast majority of records
routinely made in the regular course of business are reliable due to the
strong business incentives to document accurately, some records with all of
the requisite attributes may nonetheless lack reliability due to motivational
problems or other suspicious factual circumstances.35 In drafting the
26. Id. at 111.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 991 (2d Cir. 1942).
30. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113 (1943) (finding that the engineer’s statement
was “not a record made for the systematic conduct of the business as a business”).
31. Id. at 113.
32. Id. at 114.
33. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee’s note (“While the [Palmer] opinion
mentions the motivation of the engineer only obliquely, the emphasis on records of routine
operations is significant only by virtue of impact on motivation to be accurate.”).
34. Id. (quoting id. 803) (noting that “[t]he formulation of specific terms which would
assure satisfactory results in all cases is not possible”).
35. Rule 803(6) also requires that the records include information from an inside source
with first-hand knowledge and that the information is recorded near the time of the acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses documented. Id. 803(6).
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Federal Rules of Evidence, therefore, the Advisory Committee employed
the trustworthiness exception in the context in which the Supreme Court
recognized it and included it as part of the hearsay exceptions governing
both business and public records. With this historical pedigree, the
trustworthiness exception has been in place since the Federal Rules were
enacted. In 2014, the business and public records exceptions were amended
“to clarify that if the proponent has established the stated requirements of
the exception[s], . . . then the burden is on the opponent to show that the
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate a lack of trustworthiness.”36
II. A MODEST MODIFICATION:
EXPANDING THE TRUSTWORTHINESS EXCEPTION
By a bit of an accident of history, the trustworthiness exception was
included in Rules 803(6), (7), and (8) due to Supreme Court precedent in
the business records context. But the reality recognized in Palmer is the
same reality critics highlight in questioning the present sense impression
and excited utterance exceptions. Indeed, the concerns expressed by Judge
Posner and others about these Rule 803 exceptions are very reminiscent of
the concerns underlying the decision in Palmer.
Even if most present sense impressions and excited utterances are reliable
because of the context in which they are made, there may be circumstances
in which even a contemporaneous or excited description of an event may
appear suspect.37 One example could be a hearsay statement like the one
admitted in Starr v. Morsette,38 in which a driver said moments after an
accident that her passenger “grabbed the wheel, causing the pickup to go
into the ditch and overturn.”39 This is one of those hearsay statements that
could potentially qualify for admission under both the present sense
impression exception (if the driver made the comment sufficiently
contemporaneously to the accident) and the excited utterance exception (if
the driver uttered the statement while under the stress or excitement caused
by the rollover accident).40 These exceptions notwithstanding, a driver who
had just rolled a truck and caused serious injury might recognize instantly
36. Id. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendment. Although many courts
previously placed the burden on the opponent with respect to the trustworthiness exception,
some had not. Id.
37. Judge Posner expresses broader distrust of both exceptions, stating that “there is
profound doubt whether either should be an exception to the rule against the admission of
hearsay evidence.” United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 800 (7th Cir. 2014).
38. 236 N.W.2d 183 (N.D. 1975).
39. Id. at 186. The statement was admitted in Morsette against the speaker and her
codefendant under the North Dakota exceptions for statements of party opponents. Id. An
expanded trustworthiness exception would not apply to statements of party opponents, the
admissibility of which does not depend upon their inherent reliability. FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note. Importantly, the Morsette court noted that the driver’s
statement would also be admissible as a present sense impression or excited utterance
without regard to the self-serving nature of the statement. Morsette, 236 N.W.2d at 187.
Expanding the trustworthiness exception to these exceptions could change this result.
40. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1), (2).
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her own potential liability for the incident. The self-serving nature of the
statement that deflects blame and places it on her passenger might appear
suspicious in light of this reality. Thus, while most contemporaneous or
spontaneous excited utterances may be trustworthy, the source and
circumstances of others may render them suspect. Judge Posner illustrated
this point in his Boyce concurrence by noting that humans are capable of
instantaneous lies under some circumstances.41
The trustworthiness exception from Rules 803(6)–(8) could be expanded
to apply to additional Rule 803 exceptions to allow for the realistic and
individualized assessment of hearsay statements like the one in Morsette.42
If Rules 803(1) and (2) were amended to add a trustworthiness exception, it
would operate just like the one in the business records exception. The
proponent of a hearsay statement like the one in Morsette would bear the
burden of demonstrating that the requirements of Rules 803(1) and (2) were
satisfied in the first instance. Once the proponent met that burden, the
statements would become presumptively admissible. Still, the opponent of
the evidence could demonstrate the likely motivations of the declarant and
the suspect self-serving nature of the statement, thus showing that the
statement does not deserve the presumption of reliability that the categorical
exceptions afford it.43 Upon a finding that the opponent has met its burden
of showing a lack of trustworthiness, the trial judge could exclude the
hearsay statement notwithstanding satisfaction of the Rule 803(1) and (2)
categorical requirements. This would answer the longstanding criticism
that categorical exceptions are capable of admitting “worthless” hearsay
statements by creating a mechanism for excluding suspect statements that
happen to fall within the preordained categories.
III. A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE PATH FORWARD
As illustrated above, expanding the trustworthiness exception that is an
existing feature of the business and public records exceptions could address
criticisms about the imperfect foundations of certain Rule 803 hearsay
exceptions. Importantly, this modest modification to Rule 803 could
address those criticisms without imposing the same significant costs on the

41. Boyce, 742 F.3d at 800 (“It’s not true that people can’t make up a lie in a short
period of time.”).
42. Expanding the trustworthiness exception only within Rule 803 makes sense because
these hearsay exceptions rest most heavily upon the inherent reliability of certain statements.
See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note. Further examination is needed to
determine which Rule 803 exceptions to amend. While an expanded trustworthiness
exception is definitely worthy of consideration for the oft-criticized present sense impression
and excited utterance exceptions, there could be benefits for additional Rule 803 exceptions.
43. The opponent could satisfy its burden simply by pointing out these motivational
defects in the hearsay statement. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to 2014
amendment (“The opponent . . . is not necessarily required to introduce affirmative evidence
of untrustworthiness. . . . [T]he opponent might argue that a record was prepared in
anticipation of litigation and is favorable to the preparing party without needing to introduce
evidence on the point.”).
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trial process—in terms of efficiency, fairness, and consistency—that Judge
Posner’s purely discretionary proposal would.44
Allowing exclusion of untrustworthy hearsay falling within the Rule 803
exceptions could increase the substantive rationality of the categorical
hearsay exceptions that Judge Posner and others denounce. The categorical
exceptions purport to rest heavily on the reliability of particular hearsay
statements made for specific reasons or in certain contexts.45 The pre-Rules
concern that categories of hearsay may be underinclusive and may miss
reliable hearsay was addressed directly through the addition of the residual
exception.46 Yet, the longstanding concern about the inherent imperfection
of preordained categories as predictors of reliability and the possibility that
those categories are overinclusive has never been addressed.47 Borrowing
the trustworthiness exception from the business and public records
exceptions to allow the exclusion of unreliable hearsay falling within
additional preordained categories like the present sense impression and the
excited utterance could at long last respond to this perceived flaw in the
categorical system.
Expanding the trustworthiness exception also would strike a balance
between the need for judicial discretion in evidentiary rulings and litigants’
need for ex ante clarity and consistency regarding the admissibility of
hearsay evidence. It would not maximize discretion in the way that Judge
Posner’s proposal would, because the judge’s discretion to exclude would
be limited to circumstances in which the opponent of the hearsay satisfied
its burden of demonstrating some reason to doubt the source of or
circumstances surrounding the statement. Still, a trustworthiness exception
would provide a mechanism for trial judges to perform an individualized
reliability assessment of specific hearsay statements that fall within the
Rule 803 exceptions. This alteration would eliminate the ostensibly rigid
operation of the categorical model that currently directs trial judges to admit
hearsay that fits an exception, whether they find it reliable or not.48 This is

44. See Richter, supra note 17, at 1882–86 (detailing the costs of the Posnerian approach
to hearsay).
45. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
46. FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee’s note (describing the need for a residual
exception for “new and unanticipated situations which demonstrate a trustworthiness within
the spirit of the specifically stated exceptions”).
47. See McCormick, supra note 1, at 580–81.
48. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 2, § 8.71 (“[C]ourts should be at least
hesitant to exclude statements that otherwise fit [Rule 803(3)]. . . . The scheme of
categorical exceptions reinforces this point (satisfying express requirements is enough)—
only a few, such as the catchall and the ones for business and public records, include broadbrush references to trustworthiness.”); see also United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 272
(2d Cir. 1984) (“[I]f a declaration comes within a category defined as an exception, the
declaration is admissible without any preliminary finding of probable credibility by the
judge, save for the ‘catch-all’ exceptions of Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) and the business
records exception of Rule 803(6).” (Friendly, J.)). Although other courts have allowed the
self-serving nature of state of mind statements to be considered, the point is contested. See
United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 106 (1st Cir. 2004) (self-serving nature of hearsay
statements justified exclusion). Adding a trustworthiness exception to the Rule 803
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precisely the feature of the present sense impression and excited utterance
exceptions that the Seventh Circuit lamented in reluctantly admitting
hearsay statements made to a 911 operator in United States v. Boyce
because they satisfied the stated requirements of the excited utterance
exception.49
Importantly, this modest modification would not deprive the categorical
exceptions of their procedural integrity and rationality in the same way that
a purely discretionary model would.50 Even with the expansion of the
trustworthiness exception, the Rule 803 categorical exceptions would
continue to allow litigants to predict the admissibility of hearsay evidence
with the degree of clarity necessary to strategize about viable dispute
resolution.51 All hearsay within the Rule 803 exceptions would remain
presumptively admissible and the opponent of the hearsay would bear the
Although federal courts are
burden of justifying its exclusion.52
empowered to exclude business and public records using the existing
trustworthiness exception, this authority has not rendered the business and
public records exceptions unpredictable and standardless. Federal courts
have held the opponents of these records to their burden of showing a lack
of trustworthiness and have refused to exclude business and public records
over an opponent’s objection to trustworthiness.53 Where federal courts
have excluded business and public records due to a lack of trustworthiness,
they have required the opponent to demonstrate a specific basis for
doubting the reliability of the record.54 Therefore, the flexibility created by
the trustworthiness exceptions in the business and public records hearsay
exceptions has not undermined the utility of those exceptions or rendered
them unpredictable.
Accordingly, the familiar and recently clarified framework for
considering the admissibility of hearsay pursuant to a trustworthiness
exception would help maintain consistent rulings regarding additional Rule
803 hearsay exceptions. All trial judges administering the exception would
follow the same roadmap. First, trial judges would require the proponent of
a hearsay statement to demonstrate that the requirements of a Rule 803

exceptions would clarify this point and allow consideration of reliability within controlled
parameters that all courts would employ.
49. United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[D]espite these issues,
the exceptions are well-established.”).
50. See generally Richter, supra note 17.
51. Id. at 1883, 1893–94 (discussing the importance of ex ante information).
52. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendment.
53. See, e.g., Dortch v. Fowler, 588 F.3d 396, 402–03 (6th Cir. 2009) (upholding the
district court’s application of trustworthiness factors to reject the opponent’s challenge to the
police accident report); Ellis v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 301 (4th Cir. 1984)
(rejecting the opponent’s trustworthiness challenge to toxic shock studies by the CDC;
finding that the opponent had failed to satisfy its burden).
54. See, e.g., Nachtsheim v. Beech Airlines, 847 F.2d 1261, 1273–75 (7th Cir. 1988)
(excluding a Bureau of Flight Standards Release where the opponent demonstrated that the
FAA had cancelled the Release); City of New York v. Pullman, 662 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir.
1981) (rejecting Urban Mass Transit Administration Report where the opponent
demonstrated that the proponent supplied the data that served as the basis for the report).
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exception are satisfied, thus rendering the hearsay presumptively
admissible. Only then would trial judges shift the burden to the opponent
of the hearsay to point to specific reasons to doubt the reliability of the
otherwise admissible statement. This familiar framework would help
ensure consistent applications of the trustworthiness exception across cases
and courtrooms akin to those that have been made under the business and
public records exceptions. Further, this well-understood framework would
continue to be driven by the categorical exceptions and would allow for
quick application during a fast-paced trial process, thus eliminating the need
for costly in limine motions to resolve all hearsay objections.
Finally, and crucially, this modest modification of the Rule 803
exceptions that utilizes an existing feature of Rule 803 would avoid a
painful period of adjustment and uncertainty concerning the admissibility of
hearsay. While meaningfully addressing longstanding concerns about the
rationality of certain hearsay exceptions, this amendment would not scuttle
well-accepted hearsay exceptions that have proved invaluable to the trial
process.55
CONCLUSION
Criticism of the categorical hearsay exceptions for allowing the
unreliable to find its way into our trial process has continued unabated since
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence and has recently resurfaced
prominently in the Seventh Circuit opinion in Boyce.56 The purely
discretionary approach to hearsay proposed by Judge Posner runs counter to
the original purpose of the highly successful Federal Rules of Evidence,
would prove costly and detrimental to the trial process, and should not be
pursued.57
The Advisory Committee could credibly choose to ignore the continuing
criticism of the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions by concluding that the
categorical exceptions are serving their crucial certainty purpose and need
not achieve accurate reliability assessments in every case, notwithstanding
their purported grounding in trustworthiness. Turning a deaf ear to
complaints about the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions will not quiet the
increasingly vocal critics of the categorical model, however. Expanding the
trustworthiness exception that is an existing feature of the business and
public records exceptions to the oft-excoriated present sense impression and
excited utterance exceptions could increase confidence in the integrity of
the categorical hearsay model, without imposing the deleterious costs of a
purely discretionary approach. Adding a “trustworthiness” reality check to

55. See Liesa L. Richter, Don’t Just Do Something!: E-hearsay, the Present Sense
Impression, and the Case for Caution in the Rulemaking Process, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1657,
1699 (2012). (discussing the importance of the present sense impression in the fight against
domestic violence).
56. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
57. See Richter, supra note 17, at 1894–907.

2016] MODIFICATION TO RULE 803 HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS

1483

additional Rule 803 hearsay exceptions is, therefore, worthy of further
exploration.58

58. This brief Article is inadequate to explore fully the ramifications of expanding the
trustworthiness exception. Questions about which Rule 803 exceptions to alter, as well as
the drafting of an expanded trustworthiness exception, remain to be examined. This Article
is designed to introduce the concept as a more viable antidote to concerns about the Rule 803
hearsay exceptions than the Posner proposal discussed at this symposium.

